Files
gen1recomp/src/mods/Sandbox.lua
T
bryanthaboi 5198b35945 bazinga
2026-08-15 10:44:20 -04:00

258 lines
10 KiB
Lua

-- The environment a mod's own code runs in. Every chunk a mod authors -- the
-- entry file, an options_schema, anything it hands to load() -- runs against
-- this table instead of _G, so the only paths it can name are the ones the
-- engine hands it (mod:read, mod.storage, mod.assets).
--
-- What this is and is not: raw io/os/ffi are the only way to name a file
-- outside the game tree at all, and they are absent here, so the reported
-- "any mod can rewrite anything in your home directory" hole closes by
-- construction. Inside the LÖVE tree this is defense in depth, not a security
-- boundary: an engine module reached through require, or ImageData:encode,
-- still writes in the save directory.
--
-- Lua 5.1/LuaJIT is the target, so setfenv is the mechanism; the 5.2+ arm
-- exists because AssetTransform's sandbox needed it and getting this wrong
-- silently hands the chunk the real globals.
local Runtime = require("src.mods.Runtime")
local SafePath = require("src.mods.SafePath")
local Sandbox = {}
-- Modules that hand a mod the disk, a raw socket or a fresh Lua state no
-- matter what this file removes from the environment. package.loaded.io is
-- the one call that would undo every other rule here.
local DENIED = {
io = "the filesystem", os = "the filesystem", debug = "the debug library",
package = "the module loader", ffi = "arbitrary C calls",
}
-- Same idea one level up: love.filesystem is reachable by name, and
-- love.thread starts a Lua state this sandbox has no say over.
local DENIED_PREFIX = { ["love"] = true, ["ffi"] = true }
-- The wire, which is what the network permission governs.
local NETWORK = { socket = true, enet = true, http = true, https = true,
ssl = true, mime = true, ltn12 = true }
local function head(name)
return (name:match("^([^%.]+)")) or name
end
-- nil when the require is allowed, else the message to fail it with.
function Sandbox.moduleDenial(name, permissionSet)
if type(name) ~= "string" then return nil end
local root = head(name)
local reason = DENIED[root]
if reason then
return ("%s is not available to mods (it grants %s); use mod.storage, "
.. "mod:read, mod:list and the engine API instead"):format(name, reason)
end
if DENIED_PREFIX[root] and name ~= root then
return ("%s is not available to mods; use mod.storage, mod:read, mod:list "
.. "and the engine API instead"):format(name)
end
if NETWORK[root] and not (permissionSet or {}).network then
return ("%s needs the \"network\" permission in manifest.json"):format(name)
end
return nil
end
-- ------- the love facade
-- Dropped, not narrowed: filesystem writes anywhere in the save directory
-- (including another mod's storage), thread opens a Lua state with a full
-- standard library, system.openURL launches whatever it is handed, and event
-- lets a mod quit the game out from under the player. Everything else LÖVE
-- exposes passes through, so a new module in a future LÖVE is available
-- without an edit here.
-- value is the replacement to name in the error, or true when there is none
local BLOCKED_LOVE = {
filesystem = "mod.storage, mod:read and mod:list",
-- newThread's state has a full standard library and none of this file's
-- rules, so it stays blocked -- but the reason mods reached for it was
-- background work, and mod.fetch is that without the escape.
thread = 'mod.fetch for background HTTP (needs the "network" permission)',
system = "mod.device:powerInfo() for battery information, mod.steps for "
.. "the step bridge", event = true,
}
-- Per-mod, because the compat overrides (src/mods/LegacyCompat.lua) are backed
-- by that mod's own overlay and must not be shared.
local function loveFacade(compat)
if not _G.love then return nil end
local overrides = compat and compat.love
return setmetatable({}, {
__index = function(_, key)
local override = overrides and overrides[key]
if override ~= nil then return override end
local hint = BLOCKED_LOVE[key]
if hint then
error(("love.%s is not available to mods%s"):format(key,
type(hint) == "string" and (", use " .. hint) or ""), 2)
end
return _G.love[key]
end,
-- a callback chain lands on the real table (compat.assign decides which
-- names qualify); a module table never does
__newindex = function(_, key, value)
if compat then
local allowed, reason = compat.assign(key, value)
if allowed then
_G.love[key] = value
return
end
if reason then error(reason, 2) end
end
error(("mods cannot assign love.%s"):format(tostring(key)), 2)
end,
})
end
-- ------- the environment
-- Absent on purpose: io, package, dofile, loadfile, getfenv, setfenv, debug,
-- newproxy, module. os keeps only the clock -- getenv is how the reported
-- exploit found the user's home directory.
local SAFE_OS = { time = true, date = true, clock = true, difftime = true }
-- Per-mod copies, not the shared tables: a mod that assigns string.trim or
-- replaces table.insert changes its own view and nobody else's. The functions
-- are the same objects, so state behind them (math.randomseed's RNG) is
-- unaffected -- only the namespace is private.
local function copy(source)
if type(source) ~= "table" then return source end
local out = {}
for key, value in pairs(source) do out[key] = value end
return out
end
local function baseGlobals()
local safeOs = {}
for key in pairs(SAFE_OS) do safeOs[key] = os[key] end
return {
assert = assert, error = error, ipairs = ipairs, next = next,
pairs = pairs, pcall = pcall, xpcall = xpcall, select = select,
tonumber = tonumber, tostring = tostring, type = type, unpack = unpack,
rawequal = rawequal, rawget = rawget, rawset = rawset, rawlen = rawlen,
setmetatable = setmetatable, getmetatable = getmetatable, print = print,
collectgarbage = collectgarbage, _VERSION = _VERSION,
coroutine = copy(coroutine), math = copy(math), string = copy(string),
table = copy(table), bit = copy(bit), jit = jit, os = safeOs,
}
end
-- setfenv on 5.1/LuaJIT; on 5.2+ the env has to be handed to load itself, so
-- a caller there compiles through Sandbox.compile instead.
function Sandbox.bind(chunk, env)
if setfenv then setfenv(chunk, env) end
return chunk
end
-- Bytecode is unreviewable and, on LuaJIT, a way out of any sandbox built out
-- of environments. Mods ship source.
local function rejectBytecode(source, what)
if type(source) == "string" and source:sub(1, 1) == "\27" then
return nil, (what or "chunk") .. ": mods must ship Lua source, not bytecode"
end
return true
end
function Sandbox.compile(source, chunkname, env)
local ok, err = rejectBytecode(source, chunkname)
if not ok then return nil, err end
if setfenv then
local chunk, compileErr = loadstring(source, chunkname)
if not chunk then return nil, compileErr end
return setfenv(chunk, env)
end
return load(source, chunkname, "t", env)
end
-- The load() a mod sees. Lua 5.1 gives a loaded chunk the GLOBAL environment
-- rather than the caller's, so without this every sandboxed mod is one
-- load(mod:read(...)) away from the real _G -- which is exactly how the
-- multi-file mods in mods/ are written.
local function sandboxedLoad(env)
return function(chunk, chunkname)
if type(chunk) == "function" then
local parts = {}
while true do
local piece = chunk()
if piece == nil or piece == "" then break end
parts[#parts + 1] = piece
end
chunk = table.concat(parts)
end
if type(chunk) ~= "string" then return nil, "load expects a string or reader" end
return Sandbox.compile(chunk, chunkname or "=(load)", env)
end
end
-- The require a mod sees: the deny list lives here rather than on a stack
-- walk, because pcall(require, "io") puts a C frame where the walk would look.
-- Runtime.modRequire is how the loader's gate identifies the caller for the
-- Gen 2 facade once Runtime.currentMod has gone back to nil (a mod requiring
-- lazily from an event handler).
local function sandboxedRequire(modId, permissionSet, compat)
return function(name, ...)
-- the compat stand-in answers first, so a legacy require("io") gets the
-- rerouted table instead of the denial below (src/mods/LegacyCompat.lua)
local substitute = compat and compat.module(name)
if substitute ~= nil then return substitute end
local denial = Sandbox.moduleDenial(name, permissionSet)
if denial then error(("[%s] %s"):format(modId or "mod", denial), 2) end
local previous = Runtime.modRequire
Runtime.modRequire = modId or true
local ok, result = pcall(_G.require, name, ...)
Runtime.modRequire = previous
if not ok then error(result, 0) end
return result
end
end
function Sandbox.envFor(opts)
opts = opts or {}
local compat = opts.compat
local env = baseGlobals()
env.love = loveFacade(compat)
env.require = sandboxedRequire(opts.modId, opts.permissions, compat)
local loader = sandboxedLoad(env)
env.load = loader
env.loadstring = loader
-- a mod's globals are its own: two mods no longer share a namespace, and
-- neither can reach the engine's
env._G = env
if compat then
for key, value in pairs(compat.globals) do env[key] = value end
for key, value in pairs(compat.os) do env.os[key] = value end
compat.bind(env, function(source, chunkname)
return Sandbox.compile(source, chunkname, env)
end)
end
return env
end
-- fs.load keeps the real filesystem's handling of the file; the environment is
-- swapped after the fact. The 5.2+ arm has to go back to source, which is the
-- only reason fs.read is touched here.
function Sandbox.loadFile(fs, path, env)
if fs.read then
local ok, err = rejectBytecode(fs.read(path), path)
if not ok then return nil, err end
end
if setfenv then
local chunk, err = fs.load(path)
if not chunk then return nil, err end
return setfenv(chunk, env)
end
local source = fs.read and fs.read(path)
if not source then return nil, "unable to read " .. path end
return Sandbox.compile(source, "@" .. path, env)
end
Sandbox.safePath = SafePath.safe
Sandbox.requirePath = SafePath.require
return Sandbox